FLORUS AND THE *COMMENDATIO AD GLORIAM* IN HORACE *EPISTLES* 1.3

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HORACE'S LETTER to Julius Florus (*Epistle* 1.3) follows a recurrent pattern of the collection, combining the poet's ethical reflections with advice to friends and acquaintances. The flow and goal of the letter's argument, however, have long caused interpretative difficulty. Questions about the literary activities of the group in general and Florus in particular seem to shift without transition to the addressee's personal relationship with Munatius. And, while the poet's opinion of Florus' and Munatius' behavior is clear and direct (lines 30–36), the point of the preceding advice in lines 25–29 is less so. These lines clearly provide a transitional linchpin between Florus' intellectual pursuits and his social behavior. But what does *frigida curarum fomenta* (line 26) mean and to what does it refer? What does *caelestis sapientia* (line 27) have to do with poetry and Munatius? It has been suggested that the poet encourages Florus to subordinate all other activities to the pursuit of philosophy—even poetry.[1] Several commentators have proposed in a general way that the advice may concern Florus' unhealthy ambitions.[2] The connection among seemingly disparate items of counsel and between Florus' literary and social behavior becomes clear when the letter is considered in light of traditional advice given to young men at the start of their careers.

Horace models his advice on the kind of guidance Cicero advances in *De officiis* (2.45) on the best way to achieve a reputation as someone worthy of glory, a *commendatio ad gloriam*, especially for a young man of no particular lineage. Reading the letter against the background of Cicero's account of *gloria* in Book 2 of *De officiis* not only confirms the focus of the advice and explains the seeming change of subject at line 30; it also illuminates the difference between the statesman's and the poet's view of the route to success.[3] Horace develops traditional advice in a novel way by adapting precepts on advancement and glory

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[1] Macleod 1986: 98; Macleod 1979: 22; McGann 1969: 41.

[2] Courbaud 1914: 328; Foster 1972: 305; Hubbard 1995: 224; Moles 1995 (following Hubbard).

[3] McGann (1969: 10–32) recognized the influence of Panaetian thought in general and *De officiis* in particular on the *Epistles*, while rightly insisting that no one philosophic stance or source can account for the thought behind the *Epistles*. The social background for the precepts concerning *officia* in Cicero's work of the same name are perhaps as important as the philosophical ones, as Cicero shaped his material in conformity with his own views, which were in turn heavily influenced by conservative Roman practice (e.g., *Off.* 2.60: *ipse Panaetius quem multum his libris secutus sum non interpretatus*). Cicero finds the Panaetian view so congenial to his own that he feels confident in filling in Panaetius'

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not only to the particular circumstances of his addressee, a poet in Tiberius' entourage, but also to fit his own broader view of the arena for gaining distinction. The poet modifies the statesman's conservative strategy for advancement by proposing that literary prestige can rival the glory of achievement in the more conventional spheres of law and oratory. By putting Florus' activities in a context of traditional perspectives on prestige, Horace confirms his friend's potential for success. By revising and broadening conventional routes to success to include writing poetry, he elevates the status of the poet and recommends the value of poetry in making a name for oneself. And, by praising Florus' intellectual and literary gifts while tactfully suggesting he change his attitude and behavior towards his fellows, Horace cautions that talent, means, and ambition are insufficient for success. Thus, while congratulating Florus' generally successful fulfillment of the requisites for social success, the letter admonishes him for his failure to heed the demands of *societas*.

The opening eight lines of the letter consist almost entirely of questions seeking information on the activities of Tiberius' entourage, questions framed in terms appropriate for military as well as for literary pursuits.[4] Horace then asks about Florus' literary companions: Titius in lines 9–14 and Celsus in lines 15–20. Turning his attention to Florus himself, the poet asks first what kind of poetry he is writing (lines 20–21). The questions which have dominated the letter thus far stop, as Horace first praises Florus' talents (lines 21–25) and then gives him advice, the recapitulation of which has proved troublesome (lines 25–29). At this point the letter seems to switch subjects as Florus is asked whether he is treating Munatius with the appropriate concern (lines 30–34). The poem ends with a call for a *fraternum foedus* between Florus and Munatius and with Horace's assurance that he is already anticipating a homecoming celebration for them both.

Although Porphyrio tells us that Julius Florus was a writer of satires, our information about him is limited to that provided here and in a second letter addressed to him, *Epistles* 2.2: he was part of the group of literary men who accompanied the twenty-one year-old Tiberius on his expedition to place Tigranes on the throne of Armenia in 20 B.C.E.; he was a good enough acquaintance of the poet to be the recipient of a second letter; and, finally, Horace sees him as a man of talent and ambition in need of advice.[5]

Florus has left little mark on history, which might suggest that he was relatively undistinguished. Little as well is known about Celsus,[6] who may be identified

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major omission, the conflict between the *honestum* and the *utile*: *eiusmodi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi aliqui casus aut occupatio eius consilium peremisset* (*Off.* 3.33).

[4] Hubbard 1995: 219.

[5] Florus: *PIR*^{2} I 316. Syme (1986: 361, n. 111) suggests he may the same Florus (*PIR*^{2} I 317) to whom Quintilian refers at 10.3.13 (*in eloquentia Galliarum . . . princeps*); Moles (1995) believes Florus is a significant name, as is Celsus. This may be so, but whether the name suggests the imagery or the imagery the name is beyond retrieval.

[6] *PIR*^{2} A 478.

with the Albinovanus Celsus of *Epistles* 1.8 and who is sometimes identified with the Albinovanus for whom Ovid grieved in *Epistulae ex Ponto* 1.9. Titius and Munatius, however, may be the sons of prominent men. Lily Ross Taylor identified Titius as the son of the Syrian legate Marcus Titius, an important intermediary between Phraates and the Romans in the return of the standards.[7] In the ancient sources he is often found at the side of his maternal uncle,[8] L. Munatius Plancus, the consul of 42.[9] Plancus, the addressee of *Odes* 1.7, may be the father of Munatius, the last member of the *cohors* whom Horace mentions.[10] If Munatius is the son of Munatius Plancus, he is the offspring of a distinguished, if opportunistic, father. In addition to his consulship in 42, Plancus was censor in 22. Between times he held a triumph together with Lepidus and managed to shift allegiance from Marcus Antonius to Octavian in the nick of time (in 32 B.C.E.). With all the zeal of a convert, or more probably, the shrewdness of a survivor, Plancus suggested the honorific title Augustus in 27.[11]

Connecting both the younger Titius and Munatius with families of some substance would put Florus' competitive preoccupation, and thus Horace's advice, in a clearer context. This intriguing scenario, however, is not necessary for the interpretation of the letter. While viewing Florus as a comparative unknown among the heirs of relatively prestigious fathers in the retinue of the emperor's step-son provides a feasible explanation for his anxiety about his place in the group, the poem presents us with a young man who wants to be first, regardless of his companions.

There is never a guarantee that son will be like father in personality and character. Cicero tells us, however, that in Rome the son would be able to bask in his father's glory. That Florus has left little mark on history might suggest that he was relatively undistinguished, lacking a celebrated father who could provide him with a birthright of prestige.[12] While sons of prominent men come into the public gaze automatically, those of less conspicuous birth must draw attention to themselves through the right kinds of pursuits.[13] The son of a well-known father effortlessly secures a meaure of public esteem; Florus must work a bit harder.

[7] Taylor 1936: 170, n. 31; see also Broughton 1952–86: 2.420. Titius as intermediary: Taylor 1936: 161–162; Strabo 16.1.28; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.94.

[8] Taylor 1936: 164.

[9] For example, at Plut. *Ant.* 58 together they reported the contents of Antony's will to Octavian.

[10] Macleod 1986: 103, nn. 30–31; Dilke 1954: 87. Syme's (1986: 361) silence about the Munatius of *Epist.* 1.3 and his remark of the *cohors* ("high birth is not in evidence") disavow the connection between the Munatius of this poem and the consul. But see *PIR*^{2} M 718: "filius Munatii Planci consulis esse videtur."

[11] Vell. Pat. 2.91.

[12] *Off.* 1.121: *optima autem hereditas a patribus traditur liberis omnique patrimonio praestantior gloria virtutis rerumque gestarum, cui dedecori esse nefas et vitium iudicandum est.*

[13] *Off.* 2.44–45: *nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam quod tibi, mi Cicero, arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium coniciuntur .... quorum autem prima aetas propter humilitatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii, simul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt, magna spectare atque ad ea rectis studiis debent contendere.*

Cicero outlines four areas that would be particularly effective for Florus' situation. Horace's letter shows that Florus attends well to three; his failure in the fourth area forms the basis for the poet's advice. The first area for distinction is *res bellicae*. Cicero states (*Off.* 2.45) that the primary means whereby a young man wins commendation for glory is if he can reap any from military activities (*prima est igitur adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest*). Although Tiberius is the soldier and Florus participates only as a writer, Horace's choice of *militet* in line 1 and the playful ambiguity between building structures useful for the army (fortifications, bridges, and the like) and composing works of literature in *quid studiosa cohors operum struit* (line 6) set the letter in a military framework, recalling Cicero's observation that military exploits have always been valued in a state that was perpetually at war (*Off.* 2.45).

Cicero separates his advice about *res bellicae*, which, he claims, require physical more than mental prowess, from the remaining three precepts.[14] We will return to the first and most important of these later; the second is association with the right people (*Off.* 2.46):

facillime autem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adulescentes qui se ad claros et sapientes viros bene consulentes reipublicae contulerunt, quibuscum si frequentes sunt, opinionem adferunt populo eorum fore se similes quos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum.

The poet connects Florus and Tiberius by having their names stand in first position in the first two lines (*Iuli Flore*, 1; *Claudius Augusti privignus*, 2); he further emphasizes the importance of the relationship for Florus by closely associating Tiberius with Augustus (*Claudius Augusti privignus*). Although in 20 B.C.E. *bene consulentes rei publicae* must be redefined as Augustus and his supporters instead of Cicero's broader group of *principes*, the point—that one is judged by one's associations and Florus' connections are excellent—still holds. Tiberius, whatever his personal qualities, gains prestige from his relationship to Augustus, whose good governance merits commemorative verse; he has proved his mettle in war and peace (lines 7–8).[15]

Along with military distinction and conspicuous connections, an ambitious young man would be wise to win admiration for his oratorical ability, especially in matters of law (*Off.* 2.48–49):

magna est enim admiratio copiose sapienterque dicentis, quem qui audiunt intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam ceteros arbitrantur . . . . sed cum sint plura causarum genera quae eloquentiam desiderent . . . . maxima est admiratio in iudiciis.

[14] *Off.* 2.46: *ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam corporis, sic eae res quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur gratiores sunt quam illae quas viribus* (cf. 1.79). Perhaps the attitude conveyed in Cicero's distinction between activities of the body and those of the mind also speaks in Florus' favor. While *res bellicae* offer the oldest route, the gifts of intelligence and reason are better (*Off.* 2.46; cf. 1.74–78). Seen in this light, Florus seems to have achieved the best of both worlds: he travels with the entourage of Tiberius, yet he still constructs *opera animi*, not *corporis*.

[15] Cf. Hor. *Epist.* 2.1.229–231.

An obscure but talented young man can gain attention and respect by displaying his intelligence and eloquence in the courts, as Cicero's own experience proved.[16] Florus satisfies this third criterion as well; he, too, can advance himself through eloquence. When Horace turns his attention from Florus' companions to his addressee (lines 20–25), he praises the latter's *ingenium*:

> *. . . ipse quid audes?*
> *quae circumvolitas agilis thyma? non tibi parvum*
> *ingenium, non incultum est et turpiter hirtum.*
> *seu linguam causis acuis seu civica iura*
> *respondere paras seu condis amabile carmen,*
> *prima feres hederae victricis praemia.*

Horace's two brief questions about his friend's activities are directed, like those about Titius and Celsus, towards Florus' literary endeavors, following the pattern of the letter. But while the questions about Titius and Celsus were evaluative,[17] expressing the poet's critical opinion of their work, the literary appraisal in the two brief questions to Florus is limited and positive: Florus exhibits literary daring and facility and, in this domain at least, leads the group.[18] The poet's appraisal of Florus lies not in his questions, but in direct guidance which includes, but is not limited to, literary advice. As Margaret Hubbard has recently shown, Horace connects Florus' talents to poetry through allusions to both Pindar and Virgil.[19]

But while Florus' gifts are particularly suited to poetry, his talents range more broadly. The young man also excels in forensic oratory (*linguam causis acuis*, line 23) and in mastery of Roman law (*civica iura respondere*, lines 23–24). These two options—the two faces of Roman law—serve as a long-established route to public recognition and distinction, as Cicero recognized (*Off.* 2.49, cited above).

[16] Cicero's experience was not unique; Crassus, Cicero tell us, also won great approbation for himself at a young age through his precocious eloquence, and not through his connections (*Off.* 2.47).

[17] Debate over the tone of the literary advice in *Epistles* 1.3 began with Porphyrio (*ad loc.*): *deridet autem hunc* (*sc.* Titium) *Horatius potest tamen et vere laudare.* The letter has often been explained as ironic, implying that Titius, Celsus, and Florus are not up to the task of writing poetry (Courbaud 1914: 227–244); Stégen 1960: 51–64; McGann 1969: 40–42, excepting Florus from literary, but not moral, criticism. The evaluation of Celsus' poetic techniques is clearly negative; the queries about Titius, however, are not as clear. Despite the valid claim that Horace knew the pitfalls of adapting Pindaric verse to Latin (Courbaud 1914: 234, Fraenkel 1957: 331, n. 1; Stégen 1960: 53; Macleod 1986: 98; Kilpatrick 1986: 32; Hubbard 1995: 220), the poet's addition of *auspice musa* makes an ironic interpretation difficult (cf. Mayer 1994: 126). Hubbard (1995: 220) thinks "the passion and loud boomings of tragedy are offered as a likely escape route" to writing Pindaric verse, "an ambition incapable of realization." Rather than disparaging tragedy, Horace marks its distance from his own *tenuis Musa* (cf. *Odes* 2.1). In either case, the point still holds that in the literary sphere, Florus has little competition from among his comrades.

[18] For *audes* of literary activity, see Hor. *Sat.* 2.1.10–11; *Epist.* 2.1.166, 258; 2.2.111; *Ars P.* 9–10, 125, 382. West (1967: 30–39) gives a detailed analysis of the imagery here, an analysis which Hubbard (1995: 221) refines by pointing out the allusion to Pind. *Pyth.* 10.54 (ἐπ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὥτε μέλισσα θύνει λόγον) in *quae circumvolitas agilis thyma* (line 21).

[19] Hubbard 1995: 221; for allusions to Virgil, see also West 1967: 30–39.

Horace's allusion to the two areas traditionally most honored for their prestige (*iuris interpretatio* and *eloquentia*) suggests that winning recognition matters to his young friend. The compliment assures Florus that he has what it takes to find a place among the most talented legal minds.

Mapping Horace's advice against Cicero's precepts to ambitious young men shows that Florus conforms to a standard pattern for advancement. By adding a third pursuit—writing poetry (*componere amabile carmen*, line 26)—to Cicero's brief and conservative list, Horace encourages Florus to believe that following his genius for literature will not hinder him from achieving recognition. While Cicero would relegate all but the *iuris periti aut diserti* to a supporting and lesser role, Horace elevates the role of the poet so that it is presented as one of three choices equal in its prospects for distinction.[20] Poets can not only support and commemorate *principes*, but also win recognition for themselves.

The specific symbol of this promised success—the first prize of victorious ivy (*prima feres hederae victricis praemia*, line 27)—further supports a picture of a competitive and ambitious Florus and strengthens the endorsement of poetry as a source of glory. Ivy is not normally *victrix*; laurel, the prize for the military victor, is. That *victrix hedera* is not generally appropriate may be Horace's point,[21] consistent with his broadening of traditional political avenues to glory to include prestige won through literary accomplishments. Making ivy expressive of victory gives the viewpoint of the poet, who not only enhances the glory of his dedicatee with his poetry, but also wins distinction for himself. Maecenas' bestowal of an ivy crown on Horace in *Odes* 1.1.29–36 promises glory to both patron and poet:

> *me doctarum hederae praemia frontium*
> *dis miscent superis, me gelidum nemus*
> *Nympharumque leves cum Satyris chori*
> *secernunt populo, si neque tibias*
> *Euterpe cohibet nec Polyhymnia*
> *Lesboum refugit tendere barbiton.*
> *quodsi me lyricis vatibus inseres,*
> *sublimi feriam sidera vertice.*

The ivy crown, prize for outstanding literary accomplishment, will bring Horace glory and distinction, raising him above the mass of men. Florus is encouraged

[20] *Off.* 2.67: *cum autem omnes non possint, ne multi quidem, aut iuris periti esse aut diserti, licet tamen opera prodesse multis beneficia petentem, commendantem iudicibus, magistratibus, vigilantem pro re alterius, eos ipsos, qui aut consuluntur aut defendunt, rogantem; quod qui faciunt, plurimum gratiae consequuntur, latissimeque eorum manat industria.*

[21] Horace generally goes along with the custom of giving the laurel ascendancy over the ivy; his own shift from the lesser to the greater prize, ivy (in *Odes* 1.1.29) to laurel (in *Odes* 3.30.14–15), is a self-testimonial to his achievement in the *Odes*. Here Horace has switched roles, and unlike the first and last poems of *Odes* 1–3, in which he is granted distinction by others, Horace in this epistle plays the role of judge by telling Florus unequivocally that he will win the *prima praemia*. His ability to do this indicates his own status as a poet and a critic of poetry as well as the confidence he has in Florus.

to follow his mentor's example of seeking the elevation that the ivy crown bestows.

In extending the imagery of the political sphere to that of the literary and in affirming poetry's capacity to bestow glory, Horace may be commenting on Virgil's dedication in *Eclogue* 8, which assumes the viewpoint of the dedicatee: poetry contributes to the addressee's glory. *Eclogue* 8 is presented to an addressee who has been variously identified as Pollio or Octavian[22] as a substitute for an epic tribute to his *res gestae* (*Ecl.* 8.11–13):

> *a te principium, tibi desinam: accipe iussis*
> *carmina coepta tuis, atque hanc sine tempora circum*
> *inter victricis hederam tibi serpere lauros.*

A poem is an ivy crown which can be bound around the addressee's temples to mingle with his laurel crown as a further mark of distinction. The laurel crown designates military glory, the ivy prestige won through Virgil's poem. By juxtaposing *victricis* and *hederam*, Virgil contrasts the political and literary worlds and mingles them in a symbiotic relationship—the laurel may be ascendant over the ivy, but both have their place. Horace not only juxtaposes *hedera* with the adjective *victrix*; perhaps in allusion to Virgil, he calls the ivy itself victorious. The poetic ivy can be *victrix* not only because poetry, like public life, is a competitive activity,[23] but also because its best practitioners can win glory.

The letter thus recognizes Florus' ambitions and assures him that he has the talent to succeed and is generally following the right path to success. Horace's affirmation also prepares the way for his admonitions. The context of Ciceronian tradition and Virgilian innovation clarifies the advice in lines 25 to 27, in which Horace implies that Florus' attitude may hinder him from realizing his ambitions. His intellectual gifts guarantee his potential for success, and he seems to be doing all the right things. But Horace suggests that talent and ambition are not enough. Complimenting his strengths in traditional pursuits as well as poetry tactfully prepares the addressee for criticism: Florus is too anxious for success and it makes him difficult to get along with (lines 25–27):

> *. . . quodsi*
> *frigida curarum fomenta relinquere posses,*
> *quo te caelestis sapientia duceret, ires.*

Horace's language and meaning in these lines are much disputed. At issue are both *frigida curarum fomenta* (line 26) and *caelestis sapientia* (line 27). Of the two interpretations possible for *frigida curarum fomenta*, one is that *curarum*

[22] For a history of the dispute and a summary of the arguments, see Mankin 1988. Most recently Clausen (1994: 234) has cast his vote for Octavian. As Clauss (1995: 683–684) points out in his review of Clausen's book, however, the matter remains inconclusive.

[23] Cf. *Epist.* 1.19.35–40 and 2.2.87–105.

is a defining genitive or genitive of material with *fomenta*, that is "those cold compresses, your cares."[24] This rendering poses a difficulty, however, in that, contrary to Horatian practice, it leaves the object of the *fomenta* obscure. The alternative, and I think, preferable, view interprets *curarum* as an objective genitive with *fomenta*, that is, "cold compresses for your cares."[25] This has the advantage of providing an object for *fomenta*, but the difficulty of leaving the *curae* unexpressed.

Cicero's use of *fomentum* gives a good sense of the two possible interpretations. He uses the word not at all in his letters or speeches, but has two instances in the philosophical works, *de Finibus* and *Tusculanae Disputationes*. In his discussion of pain in Book 2 of the *Tusculans*, he shows a dying Epaminondas comforted by the thought of his accomplishment: because of his efforts, his country, formerly enslaved by Sparta, was now free and ruling Sparta. Cicero's comments: *haec sunt solacia haec fomenta summorum dolorum* (2.59). The word *fomenta* is thus equivalent to *solacia*, and *summorum dolorum* is an objective genitive. The *fomenta* which assuage great grief are the realization of his accomplishment. Cicero uses the genitive with *fomentum* differently in a discussion of *dolor* in *de Finibus* (2.95): *virtutis, magnitudinis animi, patientiae, fortitudinis fomentis dolor mitigari solet*. Here again *fomenta* is equivalent to *solacia*, but the genitive is defining, or material. Pain will be assuaged by the comforts which consist of the qualities named. The object of these *fomenta* is again indicated, however, in the subject *dolor*. While Cicero's works show that both constructions with *fomenta* were possible and neither would have jarred on the native ear, in both metaphorical instances of the word the object of the *fomenta* is perfectly clear, even when it is not contained in the genitive.

Fomentum is not a common word in other authors of the period,[26] although Horace uses it (always in the plural) four times, which may not be surprising given the general anxiety about health, not to say hypochondria, that recurs in his work. In each of the three other instances, the object of the *fomenta* is clear.[27] In one case, *Epode* 11, *fomenta* is metaphorical and parallels Horace's use here. The poet reminisces to Pettius about his former misery because of his love for Inachia. He had made a fool of himself (*fabula quanta fui*, line 8), and it embarrasses him to think about the dinner parties at which he was by turns silently moody, then,

[24] Dilke 1954: 86; Kiessling and Heinze 1914: 41; West 1967: 35. Mayer (1994: 129–130) now favors the genitive of definition, a switch from his earlier position: cf. Mayer 1985. He translates "the chilling compresses your cares apply," but offers a vague reference for *curae*: "Florus' cares—public business, perhaps love (24) and the pursuit of gain—chill his *ingenium*."

[25] Wickham 1891: 234; McGann 1969: 41, n. 2 (*fomenta* = contents of lines 23–24); Kilpatrick 1986: 35; Moles 1995. Macleod (1986: 103) wants the line to be intentionally ambiguous, comparing Ovid's rather different (and unambiguous) *omnis ab hac cura cura levata mea est* (*Tr.* 1.11.12), but offers no explanation beyond "man's proper activity—and his true medicine—is philosophy."

[26] Cicero uses it twice, Tibullus once, Catullus, Virgil, Propertius, and Livy not at all.

[27] *Epod.* 11.17: *volnus*; *Sat.* 1.1.82: *frigus*; *Epist.* 1.2.52: *podagra*.

when the wine had loosened his tongue, bitter and complaining (lines 8–14) and full of resolve (lines 15–18):

> *quodsi meis inaestuet praecordiis*
> *libera bilis, ut haec ingrata ventis dividat*
> *fomenta volnus nil malum levantia,*
> *desinet imparibus certare summotus pudor.*[28]

The object of the ineffective *fomenta* is the *volnus*, his unrequited love. But here again, as in *Epistles* 1.3, the nature of the *fomenta* themselves need to be inferred from the context of the passage. What do the speaker of *Epode* 11 and Florus use to make themselves feel better? In *Epode* 11, it seems clear that the speaker's alternately sulking and complaining are his way of consoling himself.[29] If righteous indignation (*libera bilis*, line 16) should supply some real heat (*inaestuet*, line 15) to the wound, he would be cured of his love for Inachia and no longer need the remedies—*fomenta*—he now relies on in vain for warmth; that is, he will return to his senses and refrain from such complaints as "Does the honest character of a poor man have no weight against the allure of profit?" (*contrane lucrum nil valere candidum pauperis ingenium?*, lines 11–12).

In *Epistles* 1.3, as well, the nature of the *fomenta* must be inferred from the passage. The object of the *fomenta* is Florus' *curae*, the source of which may be inferred from the preceding line, *prima feres hederae victricis praemia*: Florus' *curae* are rooted in his restless ambition. He is plagued by a very Roman source of anxiety which figures prominently in *Epistles* 1: his relative status and his prospects for advancement.[30] More than just advancement, Florus wants to win the first prize (*prima praemia*). The *frigida fomenta*, those ineffective solaces for his anxieties, are to be found in his competitive striving for place. By improving his relative status within Tiberius' entourage, Florus hopes to relieve his worries about his position. Healthy ambition combined with talent ought to calm Florus' fears about getting ahead, that is, ought to act as warm and comforting *fomenta*. Florus, however, has taken a healthy competitive urge to an extreme. By alienating those around him, Florus impedes his success instead of fostering it. Thus his means of

[28] The sense of *summotus pudor* (18) is disputed. Shackleton Bailey (1985) notes in his apparatus that *summotus* is "obscure dictum" and suggests *commotus*. For the most recent discussion, see Mankin 1995: 202.

[29] Or perhaps, with Watson 1983: 234, "wine, *amicorum consilia*, and versification."

[30] Most of the letters deal in greater or lesser degree with Roman preoccupation with status of one form or another, and several, like the letter to Florus, advise young men in their pursuit of advancement: *Epist.* 18 (to Lollius), *Epist.* 8 (to Celsus), *Epist.* 12 (to Iccius), *Epist.* 17 (to Scaeva) all offer direct advice on suitable behavior, while *Epist.* 2 (to Lollius), 6 (to Numicius), and 16 (to Quinctius) assume ambition and competition (Lollius practicing his public speaking; wealth and power are some of the options offered to Numicius; Quinctius' concern with keeping up appearances expected of his station). Other letters, such as *Epist.* 9 (a recommendation to Tiberius for the young and upwardly mobile Septimius), *Epist.* 13 (the proper decorum for a messenger), and *Epist.* 14 (the *vilicus* seeking to advance himself, but for whom mobility can only be lateral) confront the issue less directly.

comforting (*fomenta*) his worries (*curae*) about his future have the opposite effect: they are chilly and ineffectual (*frigida*).[31]

Unlike *Epode* 11, where the *fomenta* may be unspecified because they form part of the speaker's anguished ravings, here the omission reflects Horace's sense of tact: he admonishes Florus gently, without lecturing or confrontation.[32] Whether in the public eye as poet, pleader, or legal scholar, Florus wants to be *victor*, and Horace assures him he can succeed. No matter which of these pathways to eminence he chooses, argues Horace, he will surpass his competition and take the top honors. But if he would stop trying to ease his anxieties with responses which will just exacerbate those anxieties, he would reach the heights to which exalted wisdom would lead him. So, if Florus would stop trying so hard to stroke his own ego and would instead devote himself to heavenly wisdom, he would be on his way—but to where? What does *caelestis sapientia* (line 27) mean, where can it take a young man whose goal is not just to do well, but to take the top prize (*prima praemia*), and how does it prepare for the transition in line 30 to Munatius?

Caelestis sapientia addresses the conflict implied in lines 25–29 as well as the conflict between Florus and Munatius in lines 30–36. The delicate balance between a healthy personal ambition and one which threatens and alienates one's fellows again looks to *De officiis*, where the most important motif is the conflict between the requirements of *societas* and human ambition. Our highest priority, according to Cicero, must be unwavering support of the goals of the community as a whole (*Off.* 1.57):

sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea quae cum republica est unicuique nostrum omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est.

Dearest to each of us should be the alliance with the *patria*; such an association is the basis of *societas*.[33] The community needs leaders of aptitude and enterprise who will devote themselves to governing the state; both they and the state will benefit by their contributions to the public good.[34] Men gifted with the ability

[31] Courbaud (1914: 238) came close to this interpretation by identifying Florus' anxieties as concerns for his career; cf. Keissling and Heinze 1914: 41. Foster (1972: 305) thinks the *fomenta* and the *curae* are identical: "presumably anxious or ambitious preoccupations about his career"; Hubbard (1995: 224) sees the *fomenta* as "'glory and suchlike rewards' that are the assuagement of ambitious efforts"; Moles (1995) interprets similarly: "the *frigida fomenta* are something like the 'cold/ineffective alleviations/consolations for your concerns'; the 'concerns' are what Florus does (law, poetry), the 'alleviations' false glory arising from success." But Horace is not telling Florus to abandon hopes for glory; rather, he advises him on the best way to go about getting it.

[32] The ellipsis created may also be credited to the license of letter-writing and adds to the illusion of real letters created by the *Epistles*. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.19: *est igitur ante omnia oratio alia vincta atque contexta, soluta alia, qualis in sermone et epistulis, nisi cum aliquid supra naturam suam tractant, ut de philosophia, de republica similibusque.*

[33] For this passage, cf. Moles 1995.

[34] Cic. *Off.* 1.72.

and will to do great deeds on behalf of the state, however, those endowed with *magnitudo animi*, are also those with the greatest drive to power and primacy. The will to advance is both natural and, as part of *magnitudo animi*, a quality essential to great men and the health of the state;[35] but it also has the potential to destroy that community (*Off.* 1.26):

nam quidquid eius modi est in quo non possint plures excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio ut difficillimum sit servare "sanctam societatem." ... est autem in hoc genere molestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque exsistunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae cupiditates.

A delicate balance must be struck between the will to power and the responsibility to *patria*.[36] In Horace's rather different context, Florus is a man of aptitude and enterprise with a contribution to make to the public good. But he also exemplifies the man in whom the drive for self-advancement threatens the harmony of the larger group. The solution Cicero proposes to this real and difficult problem is a kind of *caelestis sapientia*—the ability to rise above the drives inherent in outstanding men and look down on and attach little value to the trappings of success. The operative words in *De officiis* for the proper attitude toward *res humanae* are *despicere* (for example, *Off.* 1.61) and *contemnere* (for example, *Off.* 1.67); a particularly nice parallel is given by Scipio in the first book of *de Republica* (1.28):

quod autem imperium, qui magistratus, quod regnum potest esse praestantius quam despicientem omnia humana et inferiora sapientia ducentem nihil umquam nisi sempiternum et divinum animo volutare? cui persuasum sit appellari ceteros homines, esse solos eos, qui essent politi propriis humanitatis artibus.[37]

The remove and balance of the philosophic perspective is not the mark of any one philosophical school[38] nor does it designate an absorption with theory: the *sempiternum et divinum* are associated with their more earthly counterpart of human behavior. Real men, says Scipio, are those who are well-versed in the understanding of how people should live.

[35] *Off.* 1.13: *huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi exsistit humanarumque rerum contemptio.*

[36] Cicero's presentation of the virtue of *magnitudo animi* centers on the tension between a drive to pre-eminence that works for the common good and one that is propelled by self-interest (*Off.* 1.61–92). Cicero's preoccupation in *De officiis* (1.64) with *nimia cupiditas principatus* stems in part from recent power struggles between *principes* culminating in the assassination of Caesar, but the dilemma originates more in the Roman competitive nature than in Caesar's personality and creates a central problem of social relations.

[37] Cf. *Rep.* 6.20: *tum Africanus: sentio, inquit, te sedem etiam nunc hominum ac domum contemplari; quae si tibi parva, ut est, ita videtur, haec caelestia semper spectato, illa humana contemnito.*

[38] Cf. Cic. *Fin.* 5.95, where Piso, defending the Old Academy, speaks in similar terms. Zetzel (1995: 100) compares Lucr. 2.7–13.

Cicero's discussion focuses on a plurality of *principes* who share in the governing of a republic, a role now largely confined to Augustus and his family (and so to Tiberius, the *princeps* of the expedition), and we can safely assume that Florus is not looking to advance himself to the highest echelon of the Roman hierarchy. The basic principle, however, still applies—competition for first place occurs at all levels. Tiberius' *cohors amicorum* would have its own hierarchies and arenas for competition and would benefit from a *caelestis sapientia* which encourages perspective and balance between individual ambition and responsibility to the group.

In addition to admonishment, the epithet *caelestis* also offers Florus encouragement. In calling *sapientia caelestis*, Horace plays with different connotations of *caelestis* particularly appropriate for Florus: that of wisdom's removed perspective and that of advancement within one's group. Being lifted to the sky is a common metaphor for exaltation in the eyes of one's fellows,[39] and such praise is likely to be heaped on those whose naturally valorous dispositions encourage them to greatness.[40] Horace uses *caelum* to suggest raised status relative to other people. As we have seen, in *Odes* 1.1.29–36 poetic success is a kind of *via caelestis*.[41] Maecenas' approval of Horace's poetry will send him heavenward (where, in typically Horatian fashion, he will bang his head against the stars). In *Odes* 3.2.21–22 *virtus* opens the sky to those undeserving of death:

virtus recludens inmeritis mori
caelum negata temptat iter via
coetusque volgaris et udam
spernit humum fugiente penna.

Caelum is not only the place where virtue is rewarded, but is also a place of differentiation from the common crowd (*coetus volgaris*). In both odes the sky is the elevated abode of the few who have been led there by *ingenium* (*Odes* 1.1) or *virtus* (*Odes* 3.2). Finally, in *Epist.* 1.17.33–34 Horace suggests that military power moves one close to the throne of Jupiter and things *caelestia*:

res gerere et captos ostendere civibus hostis
attingit solium Iovis et caelestia temptat.

Military triumphs belong to the few whose accomplishments raise them to a status closer to the gods than the rest of their fellow mortals. *Caelestia* symbolically connects brilliance among other men with the abode of the stars and the gods. In *Epist.* 1.3, as well, *caelestis* suggests the power of *sapientia* to distinguish.

[39] Of the numerous examples of this Latin idiom, Cicero's remarks about Brutus and Cassius after the murder of Caesar especially show the connection between the metaphors of being raised *ad caelum* and being *caelestis*, or *quasi divinus*; see *Att.* 14.14.3: *quae quidem nostris amicis, divinis viris, aditum ad caelum dederunt, libertatem populo Romano non dederunt.*

[40] Cf. *Off.* 1.61.

[41] Cf. *Odes* 4.8.29: *caelo Musa beat.*

Heaven-dwelling wisdom leads to the metaphorical sky, a place which Horace reserves not only for the virtuous, but also for those of extraordinary, distinctive talent.

A reading which grants *caelestis* a twofold meaning—evocative of an elevated detachment from human ambition as well as of the fulfillment of human ambition—makes sense in the context both of Horace's advice here and of his general view of *sapientia* in the *Epistles*. In the previous epistle, for example, Ulysses offers an *utile exemplar* of the power of *virtus* and *sapientia* (*Epist.* 1.2.17–18). Horace interprets Ulysses' *sapientia* as a kind of *prudentia*, a practical rather than a theoretical wisdom enabling him to understand people and politics, to avoid seduction.[42] In the same way in the third epistle Horace identifies *sapientia* as the quality we must pursue if we want to live a life which makes us dear to the state as well as to ourselves (28–29):

> *hoc opus, hoc studium parvi properemus et ampli*
> *si patriae volumus, si nobis vivere cari.*

To leave behind one's attachment to one's own advancement and to follow the directives of wisdom is an honorable occupation (*hoc opus, hoc studium*) regardless of one's position in the social hierarchy (*parvi et ampli*). It is beneficial not only to the individual, but to the goals of society at large (*patriae ... nobis*). In *patria*[43] we are reminded of our highest responsibility, the good of the greater group; in *nobis* of the ethical and tangible rewards of practical wisdom.

The idea that *sapientia* is expedient as well as honorable is part of the Roman pragmatic outlook. To suggest that *sapientia* is a distinguishing force does not detract from its status as *honesta* (ethically sound), a "heavenly wisdom,"[44] but adds to it. This advantageous aspect of *sapientia* finds a place also in Cicero's examination of *utilia* (*Off.* 2.17):

itaque, quae in rebus inanimis quaeque in usu et tractatione beluarum fiunt utiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis, hominum autem studia, ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata, virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute excitantur.

[42] *Epist.* 1.2.18–26; cf. *Epist.* 1.1.41–42. See further Mayer 1985: 69. Cicero's understanding of *prudentia* closely fits the description of Ulysses in *Epist.* 1.2 (*Off.* 2.33): *nam et iis fidem habemus quos plus intellegere quam nos arbitramur quosque et futura prospicere credimus et, cum res agatur in discrimenque ventum sit, expedire rem et consilium ex tempore capere posse; hanc enim utilem homines existimant veramque prudentiam*; cf. *Tusc. disp.* 5.7.

[43] The closest Horace comes to *res publica* is the phrase addressed to Pollio in *Odes* 2.1.10–11: *mox ubi publicas / res ordinaris. Patria* seems less "a patriotic note" (Mayer 1994: 132) than a designation which addresses the affective content, marking our responsibilities to the larger group.

[44] Hubbard 1995: 222; Moles 1995; Mayer's (1994: 130) assertion that "*sapientia* here is neither 'wisdom' nor 'philosophy,' which cannot be expected of young men" contradicts, as Moles (1995) noted, *Epist.* 1.1.24–26.

Studium sapientiae will enlist *studia hominum*, and having other men on one's side is the best way to get ahead.[45] Honoring the claims of *societas* also makes us dear to ourselves and is expedient as well as honorable. A wisdom which ensures that we are at peace with ourselves, not the plaything of our anxieties, furthers our position in the group we are a part of, or the one to which we aspire. If it is pre-eminence Florus wants, *sapientia* can show the way, and it will also provide the philosophic removal he needs.

The pursuit of this kind of wisdom is prior to, but does not undermine, the activities with which we occupy ourselves in order to make our way in the world: *hoc opus, hoc studium* (line 28) can harmonize with *quid studiosa cohors operum struit* (line 6). Thus, leaving behind the kind of competitive behavior in which he engages will make Florus dear to his country and allow him to follow the directives of a wisdom which will free him from his anxieties and lead him to a more exalted place among his fellows. Horace proposes that through this kind of practical wisdom Florus can leave off fretting about his relative position either in Tiberius' entourage or in the general scheme of things, and perhaps get down to doing what Horace claims, in his letter to Augustus, makes the poet useful to the city—writing poetry (*Epist.* 2.1.124).

Horace's allusions to a struggle between Florus and Munatius (lines 30 to 36) pinpoint a specific application of the poet's advice and suggest that lines 25–29 act as a linchpin between the lines which precede and those which follow.[46] Horace's view of the rift between Florus and Munatius, like his earlier positive assessment of Florus, follows—and indeed completes—the model Cicero presented in *De officiis*. While Florus is in the right place, with the right people, and full of promising ability, he ignores the component of success which Cicero had deemed most important—to win approval for one's personal relationships: *prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a modestia, tum pietate in parentes, in suos benevolentia* (*Off.* 2.46). A young man wins approbation for unassuming conduct (*modestia*), for dutiful behavior towards one's parents (*pietas in parentes*), and for good will towards others in one's own circle (*in suos benevolentia*). *In suos benevolentia* could act as an informal definition of *societas*. Florus can be victor in his own right and sphere, but not necessarily on his own terms: he lacks the proper attitude, perhaps in general, but certainly towards Munatius.

By virtue of his father's achievements, the younger Munatius, despite his age, would already have been more distinguished than Florus. Florus wants to be *victor*; but in a struggle for ascendancy, Munatius, who shares in the glory of his father's *victrices lauri*, has the advantage of birth and parental accomplishments, perhaps much to Florus' chagrin. Their relationship is predicated on *gratia*, a word which suggests political and social ties and influence rather than a friendship

[45] As Cicero makes clear in *Off.* 2.12–16; cf. 2.20.

[46] Courbaud 1914: 241.

built on mutual regard.[47] But even so, *gratia* forms a significant bond in the texture of *societas*.[48] The importance of such bonds closes Cicero's discussion on cultivating a reputation for *gloria* and links the end of the discussion to the beginning—part of *in suos benevolentia* is the exchange of services which promote *communitas* and win good repute in the process.[49]

Horace likens *gratia* to a badly-stitched wound (*male sarta gratia*, lines 31–32), which is not healing and gapes open, continuing the medical metaphor begun in *fomenta*.[50] It is not just that their relations, never untroubled, were mended in vain (*nequiquam coit*, line 32)—by Horace?—and were severed (*rescinditur*, line 32); the two young men have forced them apart (*rumpere*, line 35).[51] A deficiency either in *natura* (*calidus sanguis*, line 33) or in a lack of the kind of *sapientia* which Horace has just advocated (*rerum*[52] *inscitia*, 33) has rendered Florus and Munatius *feri*, wild.[53]

Just as Florus' social skills, in contrast to his *ingenium*, could be aptly described as *incultum et turpiter hirtum* (line 22), both Florus and Munatius can be seen as a pair of wild bulls fighting for a prize.[54] Like the bulls in the simile describing Turnus and Aeneas in Book 12 of the *Aeneid*,[55] Florus and Munatius are fighting for prevalence within their group, and their fierceness has an adverse effect on those around them. The bulls' battle will culminate with one bull claiming not only primacy, but also a *iuvenca*, the prize for first place. Instead of this feral clash for first place, the poet calls for a *fraternum foedus*, a bond more in keeping with their better natures.

Horace's *iuvenca* makes a fitting sacrifice dedicated to the safe return of his two hot-blooded and stormy young friends. The gentle humor and the affirmation of

[47] In *De amicitia* Cicero points to *gratia*, in the guise of *dandis recipiendisque meritis*, as a necessary but not sufficient condition for real friendship, which requires *amor* (*Amic.* 26).

[48] *Off.* 1.56; cf. 1.22.

[49] *Off.* 2.52–53.

[50] Cf. Hubbard 1995: 226. Petr. *Sat.* 113 offers a parallel showing that Horace's imagery is indeed medical here: *accedebat huc quod neque Tryphaena me alloquebatur tamquam familiarem et aliquando gratum sibi amatorem, nec Giton me aut tralaticia propinatione dignum iudicabat aut, quod minimum est, sermone communi vocabat, credo, veritus ne inter initia coeuntis gratiae recentem cicatricem rescinderet* (cf. Mayer 1994: 131).

[51] Both *rescindere* and *rumpere* can be used as medical words in reference to wounds. The shift from the passive *rescinditur* to the active *rumpere* moves from an acknowledgment of the problem to a statement of responsibility on the part of Munatius and Florus.

[52] *Pace* Shackleton Bailey (1985), who reads *veri* (following Bentley) and *Satires* 2.3.43 (where *inscitia veri* along with *mala stultitia* is part of the battle-cry of Chrysippus' philosophical followers), the more general *rerum inscitia* of the codices balances *calidus sanguis* (also general) and works better for a reference to *doctrina* as part of the educative process.

[53] The allusion to wild beasts is a frequent protreptic to reason, e.g., Cic. *Off.* 1.50.

[54] Hubbard 1995: 227; to Hubbard's citation of *Georgics* 3.164 ff. I would add the struggle for supremacy between Aeneas and Turnus in Virgil's *Aeneid*, in which the combatants are twice specifically likened to raging bulls: *Aen.* 10.453–456 and 12.103–106.

[55] *Aen.* 12.715–723.

the poet's affection soften the criticism of Florus' behavior. Changing the focus from the young men's divisive behavior supplants the winner-takes-all scenario to one which brings Florus and Munatius together with a prize they might share, replacing competition with a powerful symbol of *societas*, a convivial meal.

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